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Abstract
 
Empirical studies on the effect of sellers’ reputation on closing prices in online auctions present 
mixed results. A large number of studies addresses reputational effects in one country, especially 
in the US. Only a small number of cross-country studies inspect the moderating role of institu-
tional frameworks on bidder behavior. The purpose of this paper is to examine if country-specific 
differences in the formal and informal institutional framework influence the effects of reputation 
and information signals on final prices in online auctions. From the perspective of the New Insti-
tutional Economics, management decisions and individuals’ characteristics are affected by the 
institutional framework, which consists of cultural aspects as well as a set of social and legal 
rules and regulations. Therefore, bidders that are influenced by one institutional framework have 
different preferences, expectations, and perceptions about reputation and information in online 
auctions than individuals socialized by another institutional framework. In order to examine the 
effects of reputation and information on prices as well as to asses cross-country similarities and 
differences in these effects, a sample of 6,166 homogenous online auctions, conducted on the re-
spective eBay websites in Germany, the UK, and the US, is analyzed. The results suggest that 
either the effects of reputation and product information variables vary significantly across coun-
tries or that different variables have an impact on prices in different countries. It can be con-
cluded that country-specific institutional frameworks influence bidder behavior in international 
online auction markets. 
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1 Introduction 
 
On eBay’s website, the eBay Marketplace is described as an online platform for the sale of goods 
and services through auctions and fixed-prices offered by individuals and small businesses on a 
local, national, and international level (eBay, 2007a). In the first quarter of 2007, eBay’s overall 
net revenues reached $1.25 billion with 49 percent from operations in the US and 51 percent from 
international business operations. In 2006, eBay’s worldwide gross merchandise volume, the total 
value of all successfully closed items on eBay's trading platforms, was more than $52 billion. In 
June 2007, eBay was directly or indirectly active in 37 countries and offered localized websites in 
the Asia-Pacific region, Europe, and North America. With more than 233 million buyers and sell-
ers and 575 million listings worldwide in the first quarter of 2007, eBay is the largest interna-
tional online auction market (eBay, 2007b). 
 
The temporal and geographical separation of anonymous transaction partners in online auction 
markets such as eBay results in a separation of payment and transaction as well as in information 
asymmetries, which are a main cause of potential uncertainties and risks, especially for buyers. In 
addition to these asymmetries, one-sided specific pre-investments of buyers in the form of initial 
trust and payment in advance might cause opportunistic behaviour on the sellers’ side such as de-
livering an item with substandard product quality or not delivering an item at all. Akerlof (1970) 
demonstrated in his seminal work that, in the presence of asymmetrical information, low quality 
goods can drive out high quality goods, which results in a market of lemons and potential market 
failure. Klein and Leffler (1981), Shapiro (1983), and Allen (1984) among others, theoretically 
analyzed a strategy that sellers of high quality goods might utilize to distinguish their products 
from those of lower quality, namely the strategy of investing resources in developing a reputation 
for selling only high quality products. These theoretical models have typically proposed a posi-
tive relationship between the reputation of a seller and the price, since the seller’s reputation is to 
a large extend a signal for quality and the seller’s behavioral characteristics in future transactions.  
 
Traditional brick-and-mortar markets rely on personal relationships, built through face-to-face 
communication and repeated interactions to establish reputation and trust between buyers and 
sellers. However, Internet auction markets are characterised by limited communication channels 
and one-shot interactions (Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002). Electronic marketplaces use several 
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mechanisms and policies to counteract the challenges of the online environment. The most obvi-
ous mechanisms are electronic reputation systems, such as eBay’s feedback forum, that system-
atically collects user feedback and reports information about past interactions of buyers and sell-
ers to potential transaction partners (Resnick et al., 2006). 
 
The empirical analysis of the effects of reputation on prices in traditional markets has proven to 
be complicated because of difficulties in quantifying and measuring a seller’s reputation.1 Elec-
tronic marketplaces, which apply reputation mechanisms, give researchers the opportunity to em-
pirically test the effect of a seller’s reputation on the buyer’s willingness to pay.2 More than 50 
empirical studies, directly or indirectly, have analyzed this particular effect in online auction mar-
kets. The majority of them has been performed in the United States. However, there is a lack of 
cross-cultural studies. Dellarocas and Resnick (2003) state that in order to understand how cross-
cultural differences affect reputation mechanisms’ influence bidder behavior, future research 
must implicate cross-country comparisons of online auctions. The current study examines coun-
try-specific effects of seller reputation, product information, and auction variables on closing 
prices in online auctions both in an intra-country analysis as well as in a cross-country compari-
son. The study compares auctions of new, homogenous music Compact Discs (in the following 
CDs), digital cameras, and video game consoles that took place in February and March 2006 on 
the national eBay websites in Germany, the UK, and the US. 
 
The significance of our study’s proposed model and conceptualization is shown by its behavioral 
outcomes: institutional frameworks are found to moderate the effect of seller characteristics, 
product information, and auction characteristics on prices in online auctions. On the one hand, 
different reputation, item, and auction variables have an impact on selling prices in different 
countries. On the other hand, the effect of the same reputation, item, and auction variables that 
affect prices in different countries, varies across countries. These results have profound manage-
rial consequences for sellers, bidders, and international online marketplaces. While specific prod-
uct information policies and auction characteristics might be successfully used by sellers in 
online auctions in one country, they might be inefficient in another country. The same applies to 
reputation systems; variables that work efficient in one country can be inefficient in another one. 
                                                 
1 See Landon and Smith (1998) for an empirical, and Camerer and Weigelt (1988) for an experimental analysis. 
2 For a review of research in related fields see Wood (2004), Bajari and Hortaçsu (2004) and Ockenfels et al. (2006). 
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In the following section, the theoretical framework of the study will be introduced by providing a 
brief literature review on reputation effects in online auctions in general and the effects of coun-
try-specific differences in online auctions, followed by a mathematical model, finally resulting in 
our hypotheses. The third section of the paper covers the methodological approach and includes 
sampling issues, the process of data collection, as well as a description of the variables and meas-
ures. The results of the study are presented in the fourth section. The paper concludes with a 
summary and discussion of the major findings and an outlook for further research. 
2 Theoretical Background 
 
Literature Review 
In management and business economics, diverse streams of research have focused on reputation. 
Applying Wilson’s (1985) definition, reputation is a concept where a characteristic is ascribed to 
an individual, organization, or institution by another individual, organization, or institution. 
Reputation arises in repeated interactions where players are uncertain about the true nature of an-
other player. If a history of past behaviour of interactions is available, players with a history of 
collaborative behavior might realize higher long-term payoffs by signalling their inherently 
trustworthy nature (Kreps et al., 1982). In this way, reputation effects generate cooperation in en-
vironments of imperfect and asymmetric information (Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1982). As transaction partners might establish a positive or negative reputation, reputa-
tion is both, a source of information as well as a mechanism to sanction, since the reputation of 
past transactions as well as the probability and importance of future transactions form “the 
shadow of the future” (Axelrod, 1984). 
 
In offline buyer-seller relationships reputation is a concept that describes to which degree a buyer 
believes that a seller will behave as promised in the transaction and post-transaction phase 
(Doney and Cannon, 1997). Instead of a temporal embeddedness, where reputation is established 
by repeated interactions of players, in online auctions, network embeddedness is present where 
reputation is build through the interaction with different transaction partners (Gautschi, 2002). As 
a result, in the setting of one-shot interactions “the shadow of the past” from interacting with 
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other partners substitutes “the shadow of the future” from repeated interactions with the same 
partner. In the context of Internet marketplaces, a reputation system as applied for example by 
eBay is an online adaptation of the traditional word-of-mouth (Dellarocas, 2006). As defined by 
Resnick et al. (2006), reputation systems collect, distribute and aggregate information about ob-
servations of participants’ past behavior. In doing so, reputation reduces uncertainty about a sell-
ers’ behavior in the future and determines the degree of trust bidders tend to have in a specific 
seller (Kollock, 1999). 
 
During the last decade a number of studies have emphasized on online auction markets and em-
pirically examined reputation effects on prices in this context.3 Previous research has empirically 
examined the relation between closing prices and various variables, especially, whether and to 
what degree prices are influenced by seller characteristics, product information, and auction char-
acteristics. Seller characteristics within online auctions particularly relate to the reputation of the 
seller, meaning, the detailed information about the seller’s former transactions. Product informa-
tion includes the price level, condition, complexity, and visual presentation of the good being 
auctioned. Auction characteristics are related to specifications such as auction type and timing as 
well as escrow and payment services being offered. 
 
A search of the major online databases from 1997 to 2007 revealed more than 50 studies that di-
rectly or indirectly study the effect of reputation on prices in online auctions. While 43 of these 
studies were conducted in the US, six studies in Germany, two studies in South Korea, and in the 
Netherlands and Switzerland one study examined reputation effects. In 28 of these studies the 
effect of positive feedback was tested. 19 studies found a positive relation, one study a negative 
relation, and eight studies found no effect on prices at all. In 29 studies the impact of negative 
feedback was tested. In 22 studies a negative effect was found, in one study negative feedback 
had a positive but not statistically significant effect, and in six studies no effect was existent. In 
30 studies the effect of a feedback score was tested. 21 studies found a positive relation between 
price and feedback score and ten studies found no effect at all. In order to examine reputation ef-
fects, the studies used different reputation measures, different statistical methods as well as dif-
ferent heterogeneous and homogenous goods with different price levels, conditions, and com-
                                                 
3 For more detailed surveys of the results of early empirical studies see Bajari and Hortaçsu (2004), Dellarocas 
(2006), and Resnick et al. (2006). 
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plexities. The general result is that buyers are willing to pay a higher price for goods sold by a 
seller having a good reputation. 
 
All of these studies examine the effect of reputation on prices in a single country. As pointed out 
by Adler (1983a, 1983b), single-country studies are missing cross-cultural aspects since culture is 
not considered an influencing factor. In the New Institutional Economics, especially the three 
layers presented by Williamson (1996), management decisions and individuals’ characteristics 
are affected by the institutional framework, which includes informal and formal aspects (Wolff, 
2005). While the informal framework consists of cultural aspects, the formal framework is a set 
of political, social, and legal rules, laws, and regulations (North, 1990). In single-country studies, 
the formal and informal framework is considered constant, which follows from expanding 
Adler’s argument that culture is implicitly considered to be constant in single-country studies. 
Therefore, results and implications of studies conducted in one institutional framework are con-
strained in their theoretical and practical implications. 
 
In the online environment, mechanisms of the formal institutional framework, which support co-
operation in an offline setting, such as legal systems and repeated interactions, are less efficient 
(Kollock, 1999). While the rules and regulations on eBay’s marketplace are the same in all coun-
tries except for minor differences, the national legal frameworks differ (González, 2003). The 
costs of law enforcement and dispute resolution make trust a substitute of formal laws (Kreps and 
Wilson, 1982; Milgrom and Roberts, 1982). The uncertainty about the enforcement of the legal 
system in disputes on online auctions varies across countries and individuals need different levels 
of trust and trust premises, consequently. 
 
With respect to the informal institutional environment, culture can be defined as a set of norms 
and values (Hofstede, 1983). The variations of cultural determinants across countries and societal 
norms define a country’s informal institutional framework. The behavior is socially transmitted 
and enforced by rewards and sanctions (Fisher, 1988). In different countries the individual deter-
minants of culture have different distinct influences on the processes of establishing the degree of 
trust (Fukuyama, 1995). National culture moderates the creation of trust through reputation 
(Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994). As a result, in the process of deciding if and which seller a 
buyer should trust, the general degree of trust varies across countries (Doney et al., 1998). 
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In the context of online consumer behavior, culture influences the development of trust in online 
buyer-seller relationships (Jarvenpaa and Tractinsky, 2002; Mahmood et al., 2004; Teo and Liu, 
2007). Despite the global character of the Internet and the different formal and informal frame-
works, in which electronic auction markets operate, relatively little research has been done on 
cross-country differences in bidders’ valuation of products in online auctions. The results of these 
studies will be briefly summarized. 
 
The study most related to the current, in terms of both scope and method, is Hou (2007), which 
examines the determinants of online auction prices of LCD monitors in China and the US. The 
study results show that in China as well as in the US positive reputation has a significant positive 
effect and negative reputation has a significant negative effect on prices. Vishwanath (2003) per-
formed an empirical exploratory study of laptop auctions on local eBay websites in Germany, 
Japan, and the US in order to examine country-specific information effects of pictures, descrip-
tions, and reserve prices on the number of unique bidders and the range between the initial and 
the final bid value. The study’s findings show that the product descriptions as well as accompa-
nying pictures have different effects in different countries. Yet, the study focuses only on the ef-
fects of information on the number of bidders. The direct impact of reputation on prices was not 
considered. 
 
In a second explorative study, Vishwanath (2004a) looked closer at the country-specific effects of 
seller ratings on the number of bidders in eBay auctions of Apple iBook laptops in Canada, 
France, and Germany. The study found support for the research question if seller ratings signifi-
cantly influence the number of bidders that are attracted to an auction within and across coun-
tries. While in France and Germany seller ratings moderately influence the number of bidders, in 
Canada no effect can be found. Opposed to Germany and Canada, bidders in France do not bid on 
auctions of less reputable sellers. Robinson (2006) examined inter-country differences in reputa-
tion effects on prices in eBay auctions of fine art goods in France and the US. The study results 
show that French bidders pay more attention to negative feedback than bidders from the US. 
Negative feedback seems to decrease the selling price in France more than in the US. The results 
of the study, as also conceded by the author, are interpretations of mean values rather than statis-
tically derived results. 
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Model and Hypotheses 
Our study takes up a comparative perspective, focusing on the verification of the general intra-
country results as well as the cross-national similarities and differences of the impact of seller 
characteristics, product information, and auction characteristics on prices. The aim of the study is 
to provide further understanding on the impact of institutional framework differences on indi-
viduals’ preferences and consumer behavior in electronic auction markets. In the following, a 
model of sellers’ characteristics in a second-price auction will be introduced to discuss theoretical 
predictions and the influences of institutional frameworks on the seller’s characteristics. 
 
In order to model the effect of reputation and information, a second-price auction in a private 
values setting is used that closely follows Houser and Wooders (2006) and a modification of their 
model by Offenberg (2006). A single seller offers one indivisible unit of a good for auction, with 
the seller’s costs normalized to zero and n risk neutral bidders being interested in buying the 
good. Bidder i’s (i = 1, …, n) privately known value of the good is denoted by vi with vi > 0. In 
most countries it is common practice that auction winners pay in advance. As a result sellers may 
behave opportunistically and default on the auction contract by not delivering the good once they 
have received the payment. The probability that a seller successfully completes the transaction 
and delivers the good is described by pS  [0,1]. It is assumed that all bidders evaluate this prob-
ability according to the following equation of M commonly known reputation characteristics of 
the seller: 
,
1

M
ll
S xp   where  
M
l
1
1 . 
The observable seller reputation such as the seller’s overall number of positive feedbacks or per-
centage of positive feedbacks, which are available in the auction are represented by x = (x1, x2,…, 
xM), being a positive real vector, with x  [0,1]. It is assumed that the characteristics are a true 
signal, meaning that the reputation information is the behaviour of the sellers in the past and 
therefore should represent the probability that the seller behaves in the same way in future trans-
actions. Bidders weigh the seller characteristics according to the vector  = (1, 2,…, M), where 
each k is related to the information content in xk. While the reputation variables that provide a 
higher amount of information are weighted more heavily, observations that provide weaker sig-
nals receive a smaller weight in the calculation of pS. Seller characteristics and values of  are as-
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sumed to be commonly known across all bidders. Since all factors of pS are common across all 
bidders, pS is also common across bidders. 
 
Furthermore, it is assumed that all bidders evaluate the value vi of a product according to the fol-
lowing: 
 ),
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 
O
ll
N
llii zyv 	
  where 1
1

N
l , 1
1

O
l	 , and  1
 . 
First, bidder i’s privately known value of the good is determined by i, i  [0,1]. Value draws 
are assumed to be independent and identically distributed. Second, y = (y1, y2,…, yN) is a positive 
real vector of N observable product information characteristics available in the auction and re-
stricted to values between zero and 1. Each y corresponds to the information signal from a par-
ticular product information, such as the amount of product description or the number of pictures 
included. Bidders weigh the available information according to the vector  = (1, 2,…, O). Each 
weighted term k is related to the information content in yk. Third, z = (z1, z2,…, zO) is a positive 
real vector of O observable auction characteristics, restricted to values between 0 and 1. Each z 
corresponds to the signal from a particular observable auction characteristic such as the start 
price, reserve price, or the acceptance of an online payment service such as PayPal. Bidders 
weigh the available auction characteristics according to the vector  = (1, 2,…, N). Each 
weighted term k is related to the information content in zk. Finally, all bidders weigh the impor-
tance of product information according to the term  and auction characteristics according to the 
term 
. 
 
If bidder i wins the auction and pays the selling price b, with probability pS the seller delivers the 
good and bidder i realizes the payoff (vi - b). With probability (1 - pS) the seller does not deliver 
any good. In that case, bidder i’s payoff is normalized to -b. The expected profit from winning 
the auction, therefore, is 
E = pSvi - b. 
The utility of all non-wining bidders is zero. In view of the fact that less reputable bidders possi-
bly default on payment can still bid and win, the reputation of bidders is ignored. 
 
As shown by Houser and Wooders (2006), in equilibrium, it is a weakly dominant strategy, that 
all bidders offer a bid as their highest proxy bid according to their expected value of winning the 
 10
auction, i.e., bi = pSvi.4  If the highest bidder offers a bid above his valuation and wins the auction, 
the bidder realizes a negative expected payoff, as the selling price exceeds the expected value. If 
the bidder is setting a bid under his/her valuation and loses the auction, the bidder realizes a pay-
off of zero. In a second-price auction, the bidder who submits the highest auction bid wins the 
auction and pays the offer submitted by the second highest bidder. So, the selling price is given 
by b = pSv2 with v2 denoting the value of the second-highest bidder. 
 
Given that the established equilibrium conditions still hold, it might be more reasonable to relax 
the assumption that i =  i  1,…, n and instead to allow the weights of the observed reputa-
tion, product information, and auction characteristics to vary across bidders. Moreover, it may be 
reasonable to allow the importance of product information and auction characteristics to vary 
across bidders. The probability that a seller delivers the good becomes  
,
1
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M
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M
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1
1 . 
The bidder’s evaluation of the value of a product in an auction becomes 
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Allowing the bidders to weigh seller characteristics, product information, and auction characteris-
tics differently as well as to weigh the importance of the product information and auction charac-
teristics according to perception directly affects pS and vi. While the probability of a successful 
transaction becomes a private value equal to Sip , the private value of the good does not depend on 
the  draw alone, but also on the valuation of the importance of the item information and auction 
characteristics in general and the weighing of each single characteristic as well. Allowing pS to 
vary across bidders in addition to allowing vi to vary beyond the  draw presents an approach to 
the theoretical explanation of cross-country differences in bidders’ behavior. The described 
framework is a starting point to explore why bidders mainly being influenced by one institutional 
framework, have different preferences, expectations, and perceptions about reputation and infor-
mation in online auctions than individuals socialized by another institutional framework.  
 
                                                 
4 In eBay auctions an automatic bidding system named “proxy bidding” is applied. On eBay’s website bidders are 
advised to bid the maximum amount they are willing to bid this amount is kept confidential from other bidders and 
the seller. The bid is compared to those of other bidders and the system places bids as high as necessary to maintain 
the high bid position. The system bids as high as the maximum amount. 
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Taking all aspects into consideration, more reputable sellers signal a higher probability of a suc-
cessful transaction in the future through their reputation of cooperative behavior in the past. Buy-
ers integrate this information into the valuation of the good being auctioned, which then increases 
buyers’ valuation and willingness to pay, and therefore, results in higher selling prices. Based on 
the theoretical considerations and the presented model it can be hypothesized: 
 
Hypotheses 1a: More (less) reputable sellers will achieve higher (lower) prices. 
 
If country-specific differences in the formal and informal aspects of the institutional framework 
influences bidders’ endogenous preferences, the effect of a better reputation on bidders’ willing-
ness to pay and, as a result, the selling price will differ significantly for buyers in different coun-
tries. The second hypothesis is: 
 
Hypotheses 1b: More (less) reputable sellers receive differently high (low) prices in dif-
ferent countries. 
 
In online auctions, the channels of communication to distribute information about the item are 
restricted. According to Morgan and Hunt (1994), communication in buyer-seller relationships is 
the distribution of relevant and reliable information between the seller and the buyer, and plays 
an important role in establishing trust. The price rises with bidders’ valuation of the good being 
auctioned. This result originates, among other factors from the information given about the good. 
Sellers achieve higher prices by reducing information asymmetries through the provision of in-
formation about the item. As a result bidders assign a higher value to the good, which then results 
in a higher willingness to pay. Therefore, the third hypothesis is: 
Hypotheses 2a: The more (less) information sellers provide about the characteristics of 
the good being auctioned, the higher (lower) the price. 
 
Beside the effect on reputation, institutional frameworks influence information-giving and seek-
ing behaviour as well as information processing (Fisher, 1988), and thereby, an individual’s in-
formation sources have different effects across countries (Dawar et al., 1996). If the country-
specific formal and informal institutional frameworks influence bidders’ preferences across coun-
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tries in different ways, bidders’ will have different preferences regarding the amount of informa-
tion on product characteristics and the way the information is provided. Thus the price should 
differ significantly across countries as a result of bidders’ different value assessments. The fourth 
hypothesis is: 
Hypotheses 2b: Sellers that provide more (less) information receive different higher 
(lower) selling prices in different countries. 
 
As shown in the model, the final price is also determined by bidders’ valuation of auction charac-
teristics. Since seller reputation and product information are the main focus of this study, various 
auction characteristics serve as control variables in the following empirical analysis. 
 
 
3 Method 
 
Sample and Data Collection 
The hypotheses are tested with data compiled from publicly available information on completed 
auctions of music CDs, digital cameras, and video game consoles held on the respective national 
eBay website in Germany, the UK, and the US during a four week period between February and 
March 2006. The three countries were selected since the US represent the largest eBay market-
place in North America and also worldwide. So, the majority of empirical studies were conducted 
on eBay’s US market. Currently, Germany is eBay’s largest marketplace in Europe, followed by 
the UK. In Germany the second highest number of empirical studies examined effects of reputa-
tion on prices in online auctions. To the author’s knowledge, in the UK no studies were con-
ducted in this field. 
 
The music CDs, digital cameras, and video game consoles are selected for the data collection for 
the following reasons: 1) For all three product types it is possible to set criteria of item homoge-
neity, namely that the goods are unused and sealed. 2) Similar goods were used in former studies. 
3) In order to achieve a sample size that fits the requirements of the statistical analysis, goods 
were selected so that at least five successfully completed auctions per day could to be observed. 
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The CD as well as the digital camera sample consist of a portfolio of ten different products re-
spectively. For this, the top ten best selling CDs and digital cameras on Amazon’s sales rank at 
the first day of data collection on the website of each respective country were used. The video 
game console sample consists of Microsoft XBOX 360 Premium video game consoles. In total, 
the samples include 1,118 auctions in Germany, with 893 CDs, 125 digital cameras, and 100 
video game consoles. The UK samples consist of 1,424 auctions, with 909 CDs, 86 digital cam-
eras, and 429 video game consoles. The US samples consist of 3,624 auctions, with 517 CDs, 
1,127 digital cameras, and 1,980 video game consoles. 
 
In each country the complete sample of auctions fulfilling the following characteristics was sur-
veyed: Only data of auctions of new, unused, and sealed goods were collected so that all items 
being auctioned are essentially homogenous. In this way, the price variations observed can be 
traced to a variation in the seller, item, and auction variables and not to a variation of the good 
being auctioned. Prices for entertainment and consumer electronics tend to fall over the long term 
and bidders are likely to be well informed about retail prices in the online environment. Over the 
time period of the data collection, retail prices were stable and no unforeseen events happened for 
the product or the manufacturer in the respective country. In order to ensure the intra-country co-
herence of each country sample, only transactions of sellers and buyers from the same institu-
tional framework were part of the study. In fact, only auctions where seller and buyer were lo-
cated within the same sample country were included. All auctions where one of the transaction 
partners belonged to another institutional framework than the other were eliminated. Data of 
“Power Auctions”, “Buy it now” offers, and fixed-price offers were excluded as well. 
The professional software BayWotch 3.0 was used to collect the data. During the four-week pe-
riod two trained student research assistants and one of the authors proceeded daily as follows. 
First, eBay was searched for the items using the software for auctions containing respective key-
words that were set in advance. The software then lists all current auctions containing these key-
words. Some of the auctions were not relevant since they were e.g. auctions for consoles bundled 
with games or other items. Each new auction of only one single CD, digital camera, or video 
game console was recorded. For each finished auction recorded before, the seller’s positive feed-
back percentage was recorded in addition to the data saved by BayWotch, to obtain a detailed 
measure of each user’s reputation. Feedback profiles are updated in real time on eBay’s websites. 
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So it might have happened that a user’s profile at the time of data collection and the profile at the 
end of an auction do not comply with each other, if, in the interim, the seller had received addi-
tional feedback. In order to avoid such variances, a procedure suggested by Houser and Wooders 
(2006) was followed: Each feedback contains the date when it was posted and, since the time is 
known at which each auction in the sample closed, the number of positive, negative, and neutral 
comments from unique users at the time the auction closed was calculated. All the reputation data 
of completed auctions within the selected category were collected on their completion day. It was 
systematically checked on a daily basis whether the number of auctions the software collected 
was identical to the one shown on eBay’s site. No differences were found over the entire period. 
Variables and Measures 
The dependent variable in our empirical analysis is the gross price, in other words, the final sell-
ing price plus the costs of shipment shown on the website when the auction is completed. In the 
analysis it is denoted as Price. The price has to be paid in the respective currency of each coun-
try, which is Euro in Germany, Pound in the UK, and US Dollar in the United States. In order to 
compare the prices between the three sample countries in the interaction plots, all selling prices 
are converted from their local currency into US Dollar by using the purchasing power parity 
value (PPP) obtained from the mean final price of the respective sample. To be more precise, the 
mean selling price of all CDs in Germany divided by the mean selling price of all CDs in the US 
results in the relative ratios indexed by the cost of living in terms of music CDs. The same proce-
dure was used for the digital camera and the video game console samples. Afterwards each sell-
ing price is converted into US Dollar using the PPP of the respective product and country. 
 
The independent variables are seller characteristic, product information, and auctions characteris-
tic variables publicly available on eBay’s auction websites. The seller’s reputation is measured by 
four different variables. In eBay’s Feedback Forum, both buyers and sellers have the chance to 
rate each other after transactions are completed. Each rating is related to a specific auction and is 
noted as a number. While a positive feedback from a unique trading partner means one positive 
point (+1), a negative comment means one negative point (-1), and a neutral comment means one 
neutral point (0). The first reputation variable is Feedback Score, which is given next to each 
eBay’s user ID and denotes the sum of all positive ratings minus the negative ratings users placed 
after a transaction. After a transaction, each user can affect another member’s score just once and 
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neutral feedbacks have no effect on the score. The second reputation variable is the positive feed-
back percentage which is given right under each member’s ID and denotes the percentage of all 
unique positive feedbacks relative to negative feedbacks. It is coded as Feedback Percent. Fur-
thermore, on the feedback site of each user, eBay provides the numbers of the accumulated nega-
tive and the accumulated positive feedbacks. They are coded as Negative Feedback and Positive 
Feedback. 
 
To capture the impact of differing information levels about item characteristics on bidders behav-
ior the description of the item being auctioned and the use of accompanying pictures on the auc-
tion site are included in the analysis. The size of the product description is measured in kilobyte 
and is coded as Description. The pictures used on an auction site are measured as a dummy vari-
able coded as Picture with 1 for at least one picture and 0 for no picture. 
 
The auction characteristics describe the variables that are directly related to the auction. The vari-
able Bids accounts for the number of bids an auction received, which is reported on each auction 
website. The bidders can bid themselves or use the automatic bidding system. Both cases require 
the entry of the bidder into the auction. Hence, this variable controls for competition on the de-
mand side, in other words, among the competing bidders. The variable Competition accounts for 
the number of auctions of identical items ending on the same day and controls for the competition 
on the supply side. Sellers have the option to choose between 1, 3, 5, 7 or 10 days of running the 
auction, which is coded as Duration. The variable coded as PayPal accounts for the escrow and 
method of payment service, PayPal provides to eBay users. It is a dummy variable where 1 as-
signs PayPal acceptance and 0 no acceptance. The costs of shipping the item are coded as Ship 
Cost. The eBay marketplace allows sellers to set a start price, which is coded as Start Price. Start 
price is a dummy variable, where 0 denotes that the seller did not set a start price, while 1 means 
that the seller did set a start price higher than 1 Euro, 1 Pound or 1 Dollar in the respective coun-
try. The variable Time is a dummy where 1 denotes that the auction end was between 6 and 11 
pm, whereas 0 stands for an auction end at all other times of the day. The variable Weekend is a 
dummy where 1 denotes that the auction end was on a Saturday or Sunday, whereas 0 stands for 
an auction end between Monday and Friday. 
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Data Analyses 
One-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) of the independent variables across the different coun-
tries are conducted to examine significant differences in the means of the datasets. In testing the 
differences, the usual robustness criteria are applied and therefore both parametric and non-
parametric methods are used. For the comparison of mean values as a parametric test the stu-
dent’s t-test is used and for the non-parametric test the Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis test is used. The 
most conservative, that is, highest p-value between the parametric and non-parametric test, is ap-
plied in identifying significant relationships. To assess pair-wise inter-country differences, the 
Tukey-Kramer post-hoc procedure is used. 
 
While the descriptive statistics are given for the original data, all interval and ratio measured de-
pendent and independent variables were logarithmized before performing the correlation and re-
gression analysis for two reasons: First, for the reputation variables the weight of additional feed-
back is higher for sellers with a low number of feedbacks than for sellers with a high number of 
feedbacks. Second, the variables approximately follow a lognormal distribution. As a result the 
logarithmized variables have a normal distribution. Since the logarithm of zero is undefined, one 
feedback is added to all reputation variables. In order to analyze the effect of reputation and in-
formation on prices, the logs of the respective independent variables are regressed on the logs of 
price using a simple ordinary least squares approach in all models. In the intra-country analysis 
the dataset of each individual country is used. In order to test the moderating effect of cultural 
differences the regression coefficients of the full interaction model are compared to each other 
using the merged samples of all three countries. The merged sample includes the interaction of 
the variables with each country (dummy variables). F-tests are performed for all variables and for 
all three country comparisons in all three samples. A significant difference suggests that institu-
tional frameworks indeed moderate the effect of reputation and information on prices. 
4 Results 
 
To provide an overview of the summary statistics and regression results of the nine samples, we 
proceed by first providing an overview of the descriptive statistics of each sample, and then the 
results of the regression analysis of each sample will be presented. Table 1 reports means, medi-
ans, and standard deviations for all independent variables and the dependent variable.  
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Table 1: Means, Medians, and Standard Deviations 
  Mean     Median     s.d.   
Variable DE UK US DE UK US DE UK US 
Compact Discs Sampleb
Price 12.78 7.62 11.55 12.51 7.51 11.30 3.28 1.24 2.35 
Feedback Score 834.80 804.65 10740.73 177.00 157.00 442.00 1986.01 1711.22 49160.10
Feedback Percent 98.19 98.82 97.87 100.00 100.00 99.90 11.63 7.90 12.36 
Negative Feedback 3.30 2.27 111.41 0.00 0.00 1.00 10.50 7.38 553.33 
Positive Feedback 837.38 806.92 10830.08 178.00 158.00 442.00 1994.55 1715.70 49597.24
Description 9276.35 11356.24 14075.98 8512.00 10780.00 12915.00 5414.73 3164.57 6285.56 
Picturea 0.90 0.35 0.17 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.48 0.38 
Bids 7.47 7.53 7.52 7.00 7.00 7.00 2.92 3.64 4.15 
Competition 39.44 36.75 19.09 32.00 32.00 18.00 23.07 15.23 4.95 
Duration 6.26 6.05 5.55 7.00 7.00 7.00 2.69 2.40 2.03 
PayPala 0.14 0.90 0.97 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.35 0.30 0.17 
Shipping Costs 2.25 1.83 3.02 2.00 1.50 3.00 0.74 1.36 1.41 
Start Pricea 0.29 0.44 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.50 0.50 
Timea 0.52 0.51 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.26 
Weekenda 0.17 0.39 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.49 0.43 
Digital Cameras Samplec
Price 236.09 170.41 262.42 239.00 189.31 283.95 40.18 80.45 76.29 
Feedback Score 1335.74 251.07 917.21 138.00 76.00 153.00 4219.60 483.06 4893.29 
Feedback Percent 99.37 99.67 97.66 100.00 100.00 100.00 1.46 0.77 13.19 
Negative Feedback 4.10 0.93 6.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.46 2.29 42.10 
Positive Feedback 1337.86 252.00 820.80 140.00 78.50 155.00 4232.93 484.37 3152.06 
Description 30209.29 16301.91 30580.79 13881.00 15176.00 23681.00 46763.39 6730.10 27387.05
Picturea 0.96 0.94 0.81 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.20 0.24 0.39 
Bids 23.43 15.58 19.83 23.00 15.00 19.00 9.65 8.19 9.21 
Competition 7.03 4.66 41.39 6.00 5.00 42.00 4.12 1.92 10.74 
Duration 5.19 5.64 3.75 5.00 7.00 3.00 2.72 2.92 2.36 
PayPala 0.06 0.97 0.91 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.18 0.28 
Shipping Costs 7.86 23.48 17.66 7.90 10.00 19.99 2.64 45.72 8.67 
Start Pricea 0.22 0.52 0.28 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.41 0.50 0.45 
Timea 0.53 0.57 0.57 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Weekenda 0.48 0.30 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.46 0.44 
Video Game Consoles Sampled
Price 391.09 338.26 524.57 385.80 335.00 520.00 27.706 35.15 39.00 
Feedback Score 295.03 410.82 305.60 51.5 77.00 64.00 702.04 1255.72 1683.78 
Feedback Percent 98.53 96.27 97.25 100.00 100.00 100.00 5.80 16.49 13.51 
Negative Feedback 3.14 3.87 2.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.56 13.81 21.69 
Positive Feedback 298.17 414.69 308.33 51.5 77.00 65.00 710.51 1266.94 1701.25 
Description 11605.22 11669.49 13360.31 10200 9603 11596 5489.74 6404.98 7563.46 
Picturea 0.97 0.95 0.87 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.171 0.22 0.34 
Bids 26.54 22.94 18.52 24.05 21.00 18.00 11.38 15.73 10.75 
Competition 5.64 21.48 88.80 4.00 21.00 81.00 3.27 11.09 34.18 
Duration 3.88 3.29 2.85 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.28 2.30 2.18 
PayPala 0.16 0.86 0.96 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.37 0.34 0.19 
Shipping Costs 8.27 21.26 33.09 9.75 25.00 39.99 3.59 9.22 17.49 
Start Pricea 0.07 0.34 0.51 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.26 0.47 0.50 
Timea 0.47 0.54 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Weekenda 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.49 0.49 
a Dichotomous variable. b nDE = 893, nUK = 909, nUS = 517. c nDE = 125, nUK = 86, nUS = 1127. d nDE = 100, nUK = 429, 
nUS = 1980. 
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The median becomes important for the comparison because the means are strongly influenced by 
professional sellers with exceptionally high feedback scores as well as negative and positive 
feedbacks. Table 2 presents the ANOVA results, showing the statistically significant differences 
in the means of the independent variables across countries. 
Table 2: Results of Analysis of Variance 
Variable Compact Discs Digital Cameras Video Game Consoles 
Feedback Score US>DE/UK*** DE<UK/US*** UK>DE/US*** 
Feedback Percent - - - 
Negative Feedback US>DE/UK*** UK<DE/US** UK> DE/US** 
Positive Feedback US>DE/UK*** UK<DE/US** UK>DE/US*** 
Description US>DE/UK***, UK>DE*** US>DE/UK *** US>DE/UK*** 
Picturea DE>UK/US***, UK>US*** DE>UK/US*** US<DE/UK*** 
Bids - DE>UK/US***, UK<US*** DE>UK/US***, UK>US***
Competition DE>UK/US***, UK>US*** DE>UK***, US>DE/UK*** US>DE/UK***, UK>DE***
Duration DE>UK/US***, UK>US*** US<DE/UK*** DE>UK/US***, UK>US***
PayPala US>DE/UK***, UK>DE*** DE<UK/US*** US>DE/UK***, UK>DE***
Shipping Costs US>DE/UK***, UK>DE*** DE<UK/US*** DE<UK/US*** 
Start Pricea G<UK/US*** UK>DE/US*** US>DE/UK***, UK>DE***
Timea - - - 
Weekenda US<DE/UK*** DE>UK/US*** - 
a Dichotomous variable. † p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
There are several statistically significant differences in independent variable means for all three 
products in the three eBay marketplaces. There is no consistent pattern of sellers’ average reputa-
tion distribution for all countries across the different products. While, for the CDs sample, sellers 
in the US have a higher feedback score as well as a higher number of negative and positive feed-
backs compared to Germany and the UK, in the digital cameras sample sellers in Germany have a 
higher score compared to the UK and the US and a higher number of positive feedbacks com-
pared to the UK. In the video game console sample, sellers from the UK have a higher score and 
a higher number of negative and positive feedbacks. 
 
For product information, however, consistent patters are obvious. In all samples, sellers in the US 
use a significantly more detailed description than sellers in Germany and the UK. Sellers in Ger-
many make use of an accompanying picture on the auction website significantly more often than 
sellers in the UK and the US in all three samples. Also differences for auction characteristics in 
the means occur. Auctions in the US have the shortest duration compared to Germany and the 
UK in all three samples. In all samples, in Germany the online payment service PayPal als well as 
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start prices above $1 are significantly less often offered than in the UK and the US. In the digital 
cameras and video game console sample auctions in Germany end more often on weekends than 
auctions in the UK and the US. Overall, seller strategies regarding the use of item information 
and auction characteristics for some variables differ significantly across countries and for others 
are similar across countries. 
 
In all samples and in all countries, all significant correlations between the independent variables 
and Price are in the expected direction. As expected, in all samples and in all countries Feedback 
Score and Feedback Percent were highly correlated with the overall Negative and Positive Feed-
back. Therefore, in the regression analysis three different models are estimated for each product 
sample and country. In Model 1 the effect of Feedback Score, in Model 2 the effect of Feedback 
Percent, and in Model 3 the effects of the overall Negative and Positive Feedbacks are tested. 
The nine correlation matrices are available from the authors on request. Variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) are calculated to determine if there is multicollinearity in the analyses. A look at the VIF 
suggests that slightly high intercorrelation occur for overall negative feedback as well as overall 
positive feedback. However, the significance levels of the results remain the same whether or not 
negative feedbacks and positive feedbacks are entered at the same time in the analysis. The VIFs 
of all samples in the three countries suggest no problem of multicollinearity, which therefore does 
not affect the model fit and hypotheses testing. 
 
In order to test Hypotheses 1a and 2a, an OLS regression for each individual country was con-
ducted. In order to examine whether the forms of the interactions match those suggested by Hy-
potheses 1b and 2b a full-interaction model of all countries was tested, coded as Interaction. Ta-
bles 3, 4, and 5 present the regression result for each country. Model 1, 2, and 3 show the effects 
of seller characteristics, product information, and auction characteristics on prices for the three 
reputation measures in the intra-country analysis of the CDs, digital cameras, and video game 
console sample. Interaction shows significant differences in the full-interaction model. 
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Hypothesis 1a stated that more reputable sellers will achieve higher prices, and less reputable 
sellers achieve lower prices. As shown in Table 3, in the intra-country analysis of the music CD 
sample, the coefficient for Feedback Score is positive and statistically significant in the US. The 
coefficient for overall Negative Feedback is negative and statistically significant for the German 
and the UK sample. The coefficient for overall Positive Feedback is positive and statistically sig-
nificant in the UK and the US. As shown in Table 4, in the digital camera sample, the coefficient 
for Feedback Score and Feedback Percent is positive and statistically significant in Germany. 
The coefficient for overall Negative Feedback is negative and statistically significant for the US 
sample. The coefficient for overall Positive Feedback is positive and statistically significant in 
Germany and in the UK. As shown in Table 5, in the video games console sample, the coefficient 
for Feedback Score is positive and statistically significant in the US. The coefficient for Feed-
back Percent is positive and statistically significant in the UK. The coefficient for overall Nega-
tive Feedback is negative and statistically significant in Germany and the US. The coefficient for 
overall Positive Feedback is positive and statistically significant in Germany and the US. In the 
CDs sample, Hypotheses 1a, then, is supported by Feedback Score in the US, by overall Negative 
Feedback in Germany and the UK, and by overall Positive Feedback in the UK and the US. 
 
Hypothesis 1b predicted a moderation of the relationship between reputation and price by institu-
tional frameworks. As shown in Table 3, in the full interaction of the CDs sample, the difference 
in the coefficients for Feedback Score is statistically significant for the German and the US sam-
ples. In the CDs sample, therefore, Hypotheses 1b is confirmed by Feedback Score. As shown in 
Table 5, in the full-interaction model of the video game console sample the difference in the coef-
ficients for overall Negative Feedback is statistically significant for the German and the UK sam-
ples, the German and the US samples, and for the UK and the US samples. In the video console 
sample Hypotheses 1b is only confirmed by overall Negative Feedback. 
 
To exemplarily show the patterns of the significant moderating effects that supported Hypothesis 
1b in the above analysis of the CDs sample, Figure 2 presents the plotted interactions using one 
standard deviation above and below the mean to capture high and low Feedback Score. Figure 3 
presents the significant moderating effects that supported Hypothesis 1b in analysis of the video 
game console sample using one standard deviation above and below the mean to capture high and 
low Negative Feedback. 
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Figure 2: The Moderating Effect of Institutional Frameworks on the Relationship 
between Feedback Score and Price in the Compact Discs Sample 
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Figure 3: The Moderating Effect of Institutional Frameworks on the Relationship 
between Negative Feedback and Price in the Video Game Console Sample 
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For all three product samples at least one of the reputation variables that represent the seller char-
acteristics has a statistically significant effect on final prices. Negative feedback has a stronger 
effect than positive feedback. These findings are in line with the results of Standifird (2001) and 
Reiley et al. (2007). For example, if in Germany a video game console seller with three negative 
feedbacks receives another negative feedback, the price decreases by five percent. If the seller’s 
number of positive feedbacks increases by one-third, the price increases by 1.6 percent. If in the 
US, in the same sample, a seller’s number of negative feedbacks increases by one-third, the price 
decreases by 1.9 percent. If the seller’s number of positive feedbacks increases by one-third, the 
price increases by 0.5 percent. 
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The general result is that the influence of a seller’s reputation on the price is significant for less 
expensive products but economically marginal. For more expensive products the influence on 
price is significant and becomes, especially for the influence of negative feedbacks, a crucial fac-
tor. These results are in line with the findings of Ba and Pavlou (2002). While sellers with a 
higher negative feedback receive lower prices, sellers with a higher positive reputation achieve 
higher prices. The country-specific result is that the effect varies across institutional frameworks 
and reputation variables. Additionally, bidders in different countries use different reputation indi-
cators in the value assessment process for the same sample product as well as in different prod-
ucts. The major finding is that, while some reputation measures about a seller have a significant 
effect in one institutional framework, they have no or a less significant effect in another institu-
tional framework. 
 
Hypothesis 2a stated that, when sellers provide more information about item characteristic, the 
price will increase and, when sellers provide less information, the price will decrease, respec-
tively. As shown in Table 2, in the CD sample, the coefficient for item Description, in all three 
models, is positive and statistically significant for the US sample. The coefficient for the applica-
tion of a Picture, in all models, is statistically significant in Germany. As shown in Table 4, in the 
video game console sample, the coefficient for Description, in the third model, is positive and 
statistically significant in Germany. Surprisingly and in contradiction to the predicted relation, 
the coefficient for Picture is negative and statistically significant in the UK in the first and in the 
second model. 
 
Hypothesis 2b predicted moderation by institutional frameworks of the relationship between item 
characteristics and price. As shown in Table 2, in the full interaction of the CD sample, the dif-
ference in the coefficients for Description is statistically significant for the Germany and the US 
samples in the second and in the third model. The difference in the coefficients for Picture, in all 
models, is statistically significant for the German and the US samples, the German and the UK 
samples, and for the UK and the US samples. 
 
Auctions that provide a more detailed description, and therefore, a higher amount of information 
about the product being sold, result in significantly higher prices only in the US in the CDs sam-
ple and in Germany in the digital cameras sample. These mixed results confirm the mixed find-
 26
ings e.g. by Yin (2006), where a more detailed description of computers resulted in higher prices, 
and Andrews and Benzing (2007), where no effect of description was found for used cars. Auc-
tions, which used pictures, resulted in higher prices in the German CDs sample as well as in the 
video game console sample. Surprisingly, in the UK, auctions of video game consoles that used a 
picture resulted in significantly lower prices. Also, earlier studies confirm these mixed results. 
Ottaway et al. (2003) find no significant effect for the use of accompanying pictures, whereas 
Melnik and Alm (2005) find a positive significant effect for coins. 
 
Though the empirical focus of this study is seller’s reputation and product information, this stud-
y’s conceptualization of bidders’ value assessment includes different auction characteristics. As 
shown in Table 3, in the CDs sample, the coefficient for Bids, in all models, is positive and statis-
tically significant for all countries. The coefficient for Competition, in all models, is negative and 
statistically significant in Germany and in the UK. The coefficient for PayPal, in all models, is 
positive and statistically significant in the UK and in the US. The coefficients for Shipping Costs 
and Start Price, in all models, are positive and statistically significant for all countries. The coef-
ficient for Time, in all models, is negative and statistically significant in Germany. The coeffi-
cient for Weekend, in all models, is negative and statistically significant in Germany and positive 
and statistically significant in the UK. 
 
As shown in Table 4, in the digital camera sample, the coefficient for Bids, in all models, is posi-
tive and statistically significant in Germany and in the US. The coefficient for Duration, in the 
first and in the second model, is negative and statistically significant in the US. The coefficient 
for PayPal, in all models, is positive and statistically significant in the UK. The coefficient for 
Shipping Costs, in all models, is positive and statistically significant in the UK and in the US. 
The coefficient for Start Price, in all models, is positive and statistically significant in the US. 
The coefficient for Weekend, in the third model, is negative and statistically significant in the 
UK. 
 
As shown in Table 5, in the video game console sample, the coefficient for Bids, in all models, is 
positive and statistically significant in the UK and in the US. The coefficient for Competition in 
all models is negative and statistically significant for the German sample. The coefficient for 
PayPal, in all models, is positive and statistically significant in the UK and in the US. The coeffi-
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cient for Shipping Costs, in all models, is positive and statistically significant for all countries. 
The coefficient for Start Price, in all models, is positive and statistically significant in the US. 
The coefficient for Time is negative and statistically significant in the UK and the US in all mod-
els and for the German sample in the third model. The coefficient for Weekend is negative and 
statistically significant in the US in all models and positive and statistically significant in Ger-
many in the third model. 
 
The theoretical prediction that a higher number of bidders in an auction results in higher prices 
(McAfee and McMillan, 1987) is supported by significant effects for all samples and for all countries. 
The theoretical prediction that a higher competition results in higher prices is only supported for 
Germany in the CDs and video game console sample and in the UK in the CDs sample. Surpris-
ingly, no significant effect is found in the US. A closer look at all three samples and countries 
where “Buy it now” auctions are included reveals that competition than becomes a significant 
determinant of prices also in the US. Obviously, there is a strong crowding out of “pure” auctions 
in the US and the UK. The finding of previous studies (Houser and Wooders, 2006; Reiley et al., 
2007) that a longer auction duration has a positive effect on prices is not support by the results of 
this study. This finding is in line with Melnik and Alm (2002) as well as McDonald and Slawson 
(2002). 
 
Interestingly, there are significant differences in the effects of the PayPal service between Ger-
many and the UK as well as Germany and the US. In the CDs sample, auctions with PayPal result 
on average in an eight percent higher average price the UK and in a 17.5 percent average price in 
the US. In the digital cameras sample, auctions offering PayPal result on average in a ten percent 
higher average price in the UK and in a three percent higher average price in the US. In the video 
game console sample, auctions offering PayPal result on average in a seven percent higher aver-
age price in the UK and in a three percent higher average price in the US. In all countries and in 
all samples, shipping cost increase the price. Higher start prices (higher than $1) have a positive 
significant effect in Germany, the UK, and the US in the CDs sample and in the US also in the 
digital cameras as well as the video game console sample. This finding is in contradiction to 
Reiley et al. (2007) and Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) where start prices were found to have a nega-
tive effect on prices. Very often eBay seller guides propose auction end times in the evening. In 
all three countries auctions that end between 6 and 11 pm result in significantly lower prices. This 
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finding is consistent with Grund and Gürtler (2006) were auctions at comparable times did not 
result in higher prices, either. The results for auctions that end on a weekend are mixed. While 
auctions in the compact discs sample, that end on a weekend result on average in seven percent 
lower prices in Germany, auctions that end on a Saturday or Sunday result on average in a two 
percent higher average price in the UK. 
 
5 Conclusion and Outlook 
The first objective of this study was to gain a better understanding of the impact of country-
specific institutional frameworks on the relationship between seller reputation and closing prices 
in online auctions. The second objective was to test the moderating effect of the institutional en-
vironment on the influencing role of item information on prices. For these purposes, a sample of 
6,166 homogenous online auctions of Compact Discs, digital cameras, and video game consoles, 
conducted on the respective eBay websites in Germany, the UK, and the US, was analyzed. 
 
The theoretical framework predicted that reputation and information have an effect on prices in 
the intra-country analysis. The second prediction was that country-specific differences in the 
formal and informal institutional framework moderate the effect of reputation and information on 
selling prices through bidder’s individual preferences and value assessment, which are just as 
well influenced by the respective institutional framework. The relevance of the proposed model is 
empirically demonstrated by the significance of the intra-country effect of seller, item, and auc-
tion characteristic on closing prices, as well as the influence of the institutional frameworks in 
moderating these effects.  
 
The main result is that the influence of a seller’s reputation on the price is economically marginal 
but significant. The impact of the effect varies across countries and reputation variables. Addi-
tionally, bidders in different countries use different reputation variables in the value assessment 
process. These findings may help further research in the field of the different dimensions of 
online reputation and their effect on prices (Ghose et al., 2006), value assessment in different 
phases of the auction process (Ariely and Simonson, 2003), and on country-specific determinants 
of electronic commerce (Pavlou and Chai, 2002). They may also illuminate the understanding of 
bidder behavior in general. 
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Despite the empirical focus of this paper being reputation, the conceptualization of this study, 
concerning the valuation of auctions, includes the information given for the good being auc-
tioned. Our findings with respect to the effect of item information show that the description given 
on the auction website and accompanying pictures have a different effect in different countries. 
The current study therefore also contributes to the research on information effects in online auc-
tions (Vishwanath, 2003, 2004b). 
 
In addition to examining the effects of seller and item characteristics on price empirically, the 
study took an important first step in investigating the interplay of bidders’ preferences and auc-
tion characteristics, its effect on prices, and the moderating role of institutional frameworks. The 
study provides profound evidence of country-specific bidder preferences for different levels of 
demand, seller supply, start prices, and the PayPal online payment service. These findings have 
the potential to advance recent research on herding behavior and competition neglect (Simonsohn 
and Ariely, 2007; Simonsohn, 2006), and online payment systems (González, 2004). 
 
Several limitations of the present study merit, however, further discussion. The role of buyer ex-
perience is not included in our analysis. In previous studies mixed results were found for a nega-
tive effect of bidder experience on prices (Houser and Wooders, 2006; Lee et al., 2006; Wilcox, 
2000). In order to examine country-specific effects of bidder experience, future studies could in-
clude experience effects in their analysis. Also, a differentiation of highly professional sellers and 
more regular sellers, especially in the US, might find stronger effects of reputation in auction of 
sellers where a pure consumer-to-consumer transaction is at hand (Snijders and Zijdeman, 2004). 
Moreover, we did not examine differences in the effect of buyer and seller feedback (Zhang, 
2006) and differences in socio-economic characteristics of sellers and buyers (Black, 2005; 
Black, 2007). Also, in the present study it is assumed that bidders in each country are a homoge-
nous group. Especially in the Internet, multiculturalism, subgroups within nations, and cultural 
heterogeneity could occur (Jacob, 2005). Therefore, the presented approach simplifies the influ-
encing role of institutional frameworks. However, even in the presence of these limitations the 
findings of our study highlight the effect, which differences in cultural as well as legal aspects 
have on prices in online auctions.
 30
References 
 
Adler, N. J. (1983a), A Typology of Management Studies Involving Culture, Journal of Interna-
tional Business Studies, 14 (2), 29-43. 
 
Adler, N. J. (1983b), Cross-Cultural Management Research: The Ostrich and the Trend, Academy 
of Management Review, 8 (2), 226-232. 
 
Akerlof, G. (1970), The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanisms, 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (3), 488-500. 
 
Allen, F. (1984), Reputation and Product Quality, The RAND Journal of Economics, 15 (3), 311-
327. 
 
Andrews, T and Benzing, C. (2007), The Determinants of Price in Internet Auctions of Used 
Cars, Atlantic Economic Journal, 35 (1), 43-57. 
 
Ariely, D. and Simonsohn, I. (2003), Buying, Bidding, Playing, or Competing? Value Assess-
ment and Decision Dynamics in Online Auctions, Journal of Consumer Psychology, 13 
(1&2), 113-123. 
 
Axelrod, R. (1984), The Evolution of Cooperation, New York: Basic Books. 
 
Ba, S. and Pavlou, P. (2002), Evidence of the Effect of Trust Building Technology in Electronic 
Markets: Price Premiums and Buyer Behavior, MIS Quarterly, 26 (3), 243-268. 
 
Bajari, P. and Hortaçsu, A. (2003), The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: 
Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions, RAND Journal of Economics, 34 (2), 329-355. 
 
Bajari, P. and Hortaçsu, A. (2004), Economic insights from internet auctions, Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature, 42 (2), 457-486. 
 
Black, G. S. (2007), Consumer demographics and geographics: Determinants of retail success for 
online auctions, Journal of Targeting, Measurement and Analysis for Marketing, 15 (2), 93-
102. 
 
Black, G. S. (2005), Socio-Economic Determinants of Participation in On-line Auctions, Atlantic 
Economic Journal, 33 (4), 487-488. 
 
Camerer, C. F. and Weigelt, K. (1988), Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputa-
tion Model, Econometrica, 56 (1), 1-36. 
 
Dawar, N., Parker, P., and Price, L. (1996), A cross-cultural study of interpersonal information 
exchange, Journal of International Business Studies, 27 (3), 497-516. 
 
Dellarocas, C. (2006), Reputation Mechanisms, Handbooks in Information Systems, Vol. I, 
Handbook on Economics and Information Systems, Hendershott, T. J. (ed.), Elsevier. 
 31
Dellarocas, C. and Resnick, P. (2003), Online Reputation Mechanisms: A Roadmap for Future 
Research. Summary report of the First Interdisciplinary Symposium on Online Reputation 
Mechanisms (April 26-27, 2003). 
 
Doney, P. M. and Cannon, P. (1997), An examination of the nature of trust in buyer-seller rela-
tionships, Journal of Marketing, 61 (2), 35-51. 
 
Doney, P. M., Cannon, J. P., and Mullen, M. R. (1998), Understanding the Influence of National 
Culture on the Development of Trust, The Academy of Management Review, (23) 3, 601-
620. 
 
eBay (2007a), The eBay Company, 
http://pages.ebay.com/aboutebay/thecompany/companyoverview.html, (29/06/2007). 
 
eBay (2007b), eBay Inc. First Quarter 2007 Financial Results, 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ebay/140616995x0x91268/649ccffe-1298-4bd0-
ab53-1b33e9f9abd2/eBayIncQ12007EarningsRelease.pdf, (29/06/2007). 
 
Fisher, G. (1988), Mindsets: The role of culture and perception in international relations, Yar-
mouth, ME: Intercultural Press, Inc. 
 
Fukuyama, F. (1995), Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, NY: The Free 
Press, New York. 
 
Gautschi, T. (2002), Trust and Exchange. Effects of Temporal Embeddedness and Network Em-
beddedness on Providing and Dividing a Surplus, Thela Thesis, Amsterdam. 
 
Ghose, A., Ipeirotes, P. G., Sundararajan, A. (2006), The Dimensions of Reputation in Electronic 
Markets, NYU Center for Digital Economy Research Working Paper No. CeDER-06-02. 
 
González, A. G. (2003), eBay Law: The legal implications of the C2C electronic commerce 
model, Computer Law & Security Report, 19 (6), 468-473. 
 
González, A. G. (2004), PayPal: the legal status of C2C payment systems, Computer Law & Se-
curity Report, 20 (4), 294-300. 
 
Grund, C. and Gürtler, O. (2006), The Effect of Reputation on Selling Prices in Auctions, 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper Nr. 114, University of Mannheim. 
 
Hofstede, G. H. (1983), The cultural relativity of organizational practices and theories, Journal of 
International Business Studies, 14 (2), 76-88. 
 
Hou, J. (2007), Price Determinants in Online Auctions: A Comparative Study of eBay China and 
US, Journal of Electronic Commerce Research, 8 (3), 172-183. 
 
Houser, D. and Wooders, J. (2006), Reputation in auctions: Theory and evidence from eBay. 
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 15 (2), 353-369. 
 
 32
Jacob, N. (2005). Cross-cultural investigations: emerging concepts. Journal of Organizational 
Change Management, 18 (5), 514-528. 
 
Jarvenpaa, S. L., and Tractinsky, N. (2002), Consumer Trust in an Internet Store: A Cross-
Cultural Validation, in: Steinfield, C. W. (ed.), New Directions in Electronic Commerce Re-
search, Purdue University Press. 
 
Klein, B. and Leffler, K. (1981), The role of market forces in assuring contractual performance, 
Journal of Political Economy, 89 (4), 615-641. 
 
Kollock, P. (1999): The Production of Trust in Online Markets. Advances in Group Processes, 
Lawler, E. J., Macy, M. W., Thye, S. R., and Walker, H. A., (eds.), (16) 1, CT: JAI Press, 
99-123. 
 
Kreps, D., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., and Wilson J. R. (1982), Rational Cooperation in the Finitely 
Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Journal of Economic Theory, 27 (2), 245-252. 
 
Kreps, D. and Wilson, R. (1982), Reputation and Imperfect Information, Journal of Economic 
Theory, 27 (2), 253-279. 
 
Landon, S. and Smith, C. E. (1998), Quality Expectations, Reputation, and Price, Southern Eco-
nomic Journal, 64 (3), 628-647. 
 
Lee, Z., Im, I. and Lee, S. J. (2006), The Effect of Buyer Feedback Scores on Internet Auction 
Prices, Journal of Organizational Computing and Electronic Commerce, 16 (1), 51-64 
 
Mahmood, M. A., Bagchi, K., and Ford, T. C. (2004), On-line Shopping Behavior: Cross-
Country Empirical Research, International Journal of Electronic Commerce, 9 (1), 9-30. 
 
McAfee, R. P. and McMillan, J. (1987), Auctions and Bidding, Journal of Economic Literature, 
25 (2), 699-738 
 
McDonald, C. G. and Slawson Jr., V. C. (2002), Reputation in an internet auction market, Eco-
nomic Inquiry, 40 (4), 633-650. 
 
Melnik, M. I. and Alm, J. (2002), Does a Seller’s ECommerce Reputation Matter? Evidence from 
ebay Auctions, Journal of Industrial Economics, 50 (3), 337-350. 
 
Melnik, M. I. and Alm, J. (2005), Seller Reputation, Information Signals, and Prices for Hetero-
geneous Coins on eBay, Southern Economic Journal, 72 (2), 305-328. 
 
Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. (1982), Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence, Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 27 (2), 280-312. 
 
Morgan, R. M. and Hunt, S. D. (1994), The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship Market-
ing, Journal of Marketing, 58 (3), 20-38. 
 
 33
North, D. C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ockenfels, A., Reiley, D., and Sadrieh, A. (2006), Online Auctions, Handbooks in Information 
Systems, Vol. I, Handbook on Economics and Information Systems, Hendershott, T. J. (ed.), 
Elsevier. 
 
Offenberg, J. P. (2006), Seller Reputation as a Determinant of Price in Online Auction: Theory 
and Evidence from Gift Card Sales, Working Paper, Loyola Marymount University, Los 
Angeles. 
 
Ottaway, T. A., Bruneau, C. L., and Evans, G. E. (2003), The impact of auction item image and 
buyer/seller feedback rating on electronic auctions, Journal of Computer Information Sys-
tems, 43 (3), 56-60. 
 
Pavlou, P. A. and Chai, L. (2002), What Drives Electronic Commerce across Cultures? A cross-
Cultural Empirical Investigation of the Theory of Planned Behavior, Journal of Electronic 
Commerce Research, 3 (4), 240-253. 
 
Reiley, D., Bryan, D., Prasad, N., and Reeves, D. (2007), Pennies from eBay: the Determinants of 
Price in Online Auctions, Journal of Industrial Economics, 55 (2), 223-233. 
 
Resnick, P. and Zeckhauser, R. (2002), Trust Among Strangers in Internet Transactions: Empiri-
cal Analysis of eBay's Reputation System, in: Baye, M. R. (ed), The Economics of the 
Internet and E-Commerce, Advances in Applied Microeconomics Vol. 11, JAI Press, Ox-
ford. 
 
Resnick, P., Zeckhauser, R., Swanson, J., and Lockwood, K. (2006), The Value of Reputation on 
eBay: A Controlled Experiment, Experimental Economics, 9 (2), 79-101 
 
Robinson, L. (2006), Online Art Auctions à la française and à l’américaine: eBay France and 
eBay USA, The Social Science Computer Review, 24 (4), 426-444. 
 
Shapiro, C. (1983), Premiums for high quality products as returns to reputations. Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, 98 (4), 659-679. 
 
Simonsohn, U. (2006), eBay's Crowded Evenings: Competition Neglect in the Field, Working 
Paper. 
 
Simonsohn, U. and Ariely D. (2007), When Rational Sellers Face Non-Rational Consumers: Evi-
dence from Herding on eBay, Working Paper. 
 
Snijders, C. and Zijdeman, R. L. (2004), Reputation and Internet Auctions: eBay and Beyond, 
Analyse und Kritik, 26 (1), 158-184. 
 
Standifird, S. S. (2001), Reputation and e-commerce: eBay auctions and the asymmetrical impact 
of positive and negative ratings, Journal of Management, 27 (3), 279-295. 
 
 34
Teo, T. S. H. and Liu, J. (2007), Consumer trust in e-commerce in the United States, Singapore 
and China, The International Journal of Management Science, 35 (1), 22-38. 
 
Vishwanath, A. (2003), Comparing Online Information Effects: A Cross-Cultural Comparison of 
Online Information and Uncertainty Avoidance. Communication Research, 30 (6), 579-598. 
  
Vishwanath, A. (2004a), Manifestations of interpersonal trust in online interaction: A cross-
cultural study comparing the differential utilization of seller ratings by eBay participants in 
Canada, France, and Germany. New Media & Society, 6 (2), 219-234. 
 
Vishwanath, A. (2004b), An Empirical Investigation Into the Use of Heuristics and Information 
Cues by Bidders in Online Auctions, Electronic Markets, 14 (3), 178-185. 
 
Wilcox, R. T. (2000), Experts and Amateurs: The Role of Experience in Internet Auctions, Mar-
keting Letters, 11 (4), 363-374. 
 
Williamson, O. (1996), The Mechanisms of Governance, New York: Oxford. University Press. 
 
Wilson, R. (1985), Reputations in Games and Markets, in: A. Roth (ed.), Game-Theoretic Models 
of Bargaining, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
 
Wolff, B. (2005), Internationales Management aus der Perspektive der Neuen Institutionenöko-
nomik, in: Managementforschung 15: Institutionenökonomik als Managementlehre?, Wies-
baden: Gabler, 107-143. 
 
Wood, C. A. (2004), Current and Future Insights From Online Auctions: A Research Framework 
of Selected Articles in Online Auctions, in: Shaw, M., Blanning, R., Strader, T. and Whin-
ston, A. (eds.), Handbook on Electronic Commerce, Springer-Verlag. 
 
Yamagishi, T. and Yamagishi, J. (1994), Trust and commitment in the United States and Japan, 
Motivation and Emotion, 18 (2), 129-165. 
 
Yin, P. L. (2006), Information Dispersion and auction prices, HBS Working Paper Number: 06-
011, Harvard Business School. 
 
Zhang, J. (2006), The roles of players and reputation: evidence from eBay online auctions, Deci-
sion Support Systems, 42 (3), 1800-1818. 
